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fornia some of its richest production has been achieved br
tapping the deeper sands after shallower production had been
largely exhausted. It seems difficult to conceive of a more
useless, unnecessary and wholly arbitrary "regulation" than
that involved herein, which while permitting the drilling for,
and the production of, oil on plaintiff's property limits the>
drilling and production to preexisting depths.
T would reverse the judgment.

[L. A. No. 22434.

In Bank.

Mar. 27, 1953.]

IRWIN M. LOWE, Petitioner, v. STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent.
[1] Attorneys-Disciplinary Proceedings- Hearing- Findings.Where an attorney is charged with having made a false statement under oath in court with reference to money held by him
for purchase of a minor's interest in an estate, findings of
local administrative committee and Board of Governors of
State Bar that when he made such statement he mistakenly
believed the court desired to know whether he had in his
possession, or had ever had, any funds of such estate or of
such minor, and that the information which he then intended
to state to the court was true, amounts to a finding of an incorrect statement made without intent to deceive, and properly
should be considered as a vindication of misconduct charged
in connection therewith.
[2] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Violation of Oath and Duties
as Attorney.-Gross negligence of an attorney is a breach of
the fiduciary relationship that binds the attorney to the most
conscientious fidelity to the interests of his client; it warrants
disciplinary action, since it is a violation of his oath to discharge his duties to the best of his knowledge and ability.
(Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 6067, 6103.)
[3] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Hearing- Evidence.-Conclusion of local administrative committee and Board of Governors
of State Bar that accused attorney's conduct in overdrawing a
trust account constituted more than negligence and carelessness
on his part and that he was guilty of professional misconduct
is justified by evidence that a check for $750 was delivered
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, §§ 65, 68; Am.Jur., Attorneys at Law, § 261 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Attorneys,§ 172(9); [2] Attorneys,
§ 137; [4] Attorneys,§ 139; [5] Attorneys, § 174.
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to him to be used for the purchase of a minor's interest in an
estate, that during his negotiations with the minor's representatives, which continued for more than three years after depositing the proceeds of such check in his trust account, there
were many deposits in and withdrawals from such account,
that on numerous occasions the account fell below $750 and
in some instances it was completely overdrawn, that he continued to make overdrafts against it after he was informed
by the bank that the account was overdrawn, that he was
unable to explain why the account was depleted below $750,
and that he did not employ a bookkeeping system which would
show a balance of funds he held in trust.
[ 4] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings- Misconduct Toward Court.Untrue statement made by attorney to court that there had
always been in excess of $750 in his trust account subsequent
to time of deposit of that sum therein, which was more than
three years previously, constitutes professional misconduct in
violation of Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068 (d), if made with intent
to deceive the court, although the accounting proceeding then
before the court had nothing to do with the condition of the
attorney's trust account and it is doubtful whether his statement had an influence on the court's action in that proceeding.
[5] Id.- Disciplinary Proceedings- Review- Punishment.- Although evidence supports findings of local administrative committee and Board of Governors of State Bar that accused attorney was guilty of professional misconduct in wilfully and
knowingly causing trust funds to be withdrawn from a trust
account and to be used for purposes other than those for which
they were entrusted to him, without the knowledge or consent of his clients, and also in making false statements in
court in regard to such trust account, where it appears that
he had no intention of defrauding his clients, the Supreme
Court will suspend him from the practice of law for two years,
as recommended by the local administrative committee, and
not disbar him, as recommended by the Board of Governors.

PROCEEDING to review a recommendation of disbarment
of an attorney. Petitioner suspended for two years.
,John W. Preston for Petitioner.
Richard C. Heaton and Jerold E. Weil for Respondent.
THE COURT.-The petitioner, Irwin M. Lowe, seeks a
review of a recommendation of the Board of Governors of
The State Bar that he be disbarred from the practice of the
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law. The Board of Governors approved and adopted :findings of fact of a local administrative committee, which on
these findings had recommended that the petitioner be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years.
The events leading up to this proceeding against the petitioner began in July, 1948. For several years prior to that
time he had represented Joe Diaz and Pilar Vargas in their
legal matters. The two were brothers-in-law and partners
in a restaurant business. They were of Mexican extraction
and were uneducated. They had difficulty in understanding
the English language and the legal aspects of business transactions. In July, 1948, they delivered to the petitioner a
check for $750 made payable to him with instructions that
it was to be used for the purchase of the interest of a minor
nephew of Pilar Vargas in the estate of Refugio Vargas, the
deceased father of Pilar and grandfather of the minor. The
petitioner promptly deposited the proceeds of the check in
his trust account in the Oxnard Branch of the Security-First
National Bank of Los Angeles. He thereafter entered into
negotiations with the proper representatives of the minor for
the purchase of the latter's interest in the estate which consisted entirely of real property. The parties were unable
to agree upon a satisfactory price. During the period of
negotiations they found that there was a cloud on the title.
They were unable to agree upon who should bear the costs
of approximately $250 necessary to clear title. The petitioner failed to reach an agreement with the representatives
of the minor, although negotiations continued for more than
three years.
During the period of negotiations there were a great many
deposits in and withdrawals from the petitioner's trust account. The balance varied over a wide range, and on numerous occasions it fell below $750, the amount entrusted to
the petitioner by his clients. The petitioner's bank statement shows that in many instances checks were charged
against the trust account leaving balances of less than $750,
and in some of these instances the account was completely
overdrawn. The petitioner admits that he was promptly
informed of these overdrawals. A bank official testified that
upon notification, of an overdrawal the petitioner was always
prompt in replenishing the account. The findings of fact
recite that the petitioner "Wilfully and knowingly caused
said trust funds to be withdrawn from said trust account
and to be used for purposes other than those for which they
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were entrusted to respondent, without the knowledge or consent of respondent's said clients." Upon the admitted facts
this finding cannot rightfully be controverted but the further finding that ''in so misappropriating said trust funds
respondent did not intend permanently to deprive said clients
thereof," is also amply supported by the record.
The conduct described above formed the basis of the first
act of misconduct set forth in the notice to show cause.
Upon the findings quoted both the local administrative committee and the Board of Governors concluded that the petitioner was guilty of professional misconduct consisting of
the violation of his duties as an attorney at law and that
his conduct involved moral turpitude (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ § 6067, 6103, 6106).
As a second act of misconduct the notice to show cause
charged that the petitioner made a false statement under
oath in the Superior Court of the County of Ventura. In
a proceeding in that court for an accounting by the administratrix of the estate of Refugio Vargas and at a time when
the petitioner was not present in court the administratrix
stated that the petitioner held certain funds for the estate.
The record indicates that the administratrix apparently had
reference to the $750 held by the petitioner for the purchase
of the minor's interest, and that she erroneously thought the
$750 had been paid into or on behalf of the estate. She, like
the other members of the family, was uneducated and ignorant
of business and legal transactions. She was not represented
by counsel at the time of her statement. A citation was issued
ordering the petitioner's presence at a continued hearing
to be held on the morning of September 17, 1951. 'I' he citation
was not served, but on that morning the petitioner informally
learned that he should appear and he promptly did so. He
contends that he was not fully aware of the reason he had been
ordered to appear and that he knew only that the proceeding
was one for an accounting of the assets, rents, issues and profits
of an estate with which he was not connected. There ,is evidence in the record of that proceeding that the petitioner's
two clients were under the impression that the purchase of
the property interest had been consummated. However, the
record furnishes no basis for a reasonable belief of this nature
and the testimony of the two clients, derived through a Mexican interpreter, is conflicting and confusing. It is apparent
that they did not understand the nature of their transaction
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although they apparently had been kept informed of its development.
Under these circumstances the petitioner stated, in answer
to inquiries by the court, that he did not have or had not had
any money in the amount of approximately $750 that was to go
to the representatives of a minor child for the purpose of purchasing the interest of the minor in the estate of Refugio
Vargas. He later explained to the court that it did not occur
to him that the court had reference to money he held for
the purchase of the minor's interest if an agreement could be
reached and that until an agreement was reached the money
was not held for the purchase of the minor's interest.
[1] Although the local administrative committee and the
Board of Governors found that the petitioner's statement was
not true, they further found that "when respondent [petitioner here] made said statement he mistakenly believed the
Court desired to know whether respondent had in his possession, or had ever had, any funds of said estate or of said minor;
and respondent intended by said statement to inform the
Court that he did not have and had never had any funds
of said estate or of said minor. That the information which
respondent then and there intended to state to' said Court
was true.'' This amounts to a finding of an incorrect statement made without intent to deceive, and properly should be
considered as a vindication of the misconduct charged in the
notice to show cause in connection thereto.
At the same hearing the petitioner made the following
statements to the court in answer to its inquiries:
The Court: ''Have you ever used any of this money at
any time under any circumstances or conditions for your
own?''
The Petitioner: "No. It is in a trust account fund, separate
and apart from my own funds.''
The Court : ''And at all times since the date this money
was deposited, which was on apparently the 31st day of July,
] 948, there has been in excess of $750.00 in that trust account, is that true?"
The Petitioner: ''That is correct.''
The true condition of the account during the period the
petitioner held the $750 has been stated. The petitioner admits that the statement last recited was incorrect. He stated
that it was made before he had an opportunity to refer to all
of his books and records and that he had requested a continuance for this purpose. The findings state that the above
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testimony ''was false in that said trust account had been overdrawn four times between July 31, 1948 and September 17,
1951 and in that said trust account had contained balances of
less than $750.00 at numerous times between ,July 31, 1948 and
September 17, 1951."
The local administrative committee and the Board of
Governors concluded that by the false statements in regard to
the trust account the petitioner was guilty of professional
misconduct in violation of his oath of office and his duties as
an attorney (State Bar Act, §§ 6067, 6068(d), 6103, 6106,
6128(a)) and that such conduct involved moral turpitude.
From a review of the record it is evident that the petitioner did what he was charged with having done. He does
not question the findings with reference to what took place.
He does challenge the severity of the discipline recommended
by the Board of Governors and the sufficiency of the evidence
to support the findings as to his state of mind in connection
with depleting his trust account below the sum of $750, and
in stating to the court that the account had never fallen below that amount.
The petitioner attempts to excuse his failure to maintain
$750 in his trust account on the ground that withdrawals in
excess of that amount were unintentional. The account should
have shown a balance at all times of $750 plus whatever other
trust funds were deposited therein from time to time. ·while
he insists that no improper withdrawals were made, and that
there is no evidence that withdrawals from the account
were for purposes other than those for which the account was
intended to be used, he is unable to explain why the account
was depleted below the $750. When asked to explain the
reason for the recurring deficiencies to the local administrative
committee he stated, "Well, I have mulled over that and
tried my best to figure it out. I don't know whether some
funds of some other funds were not deposited in the proper
account or whether-I just can't give you an answer to that
. . . I honestly don't know . . . I kept records but they are
so scattered . . . I don't know-I honestly wish there was
some way that I could discover for myself what has actually
happened here. I honestly don't know. That is all." Statements of a similar nature were made to the Board of
Governors.
The petitioner was the only one authorized to issue checks
on the trust account, but he suggests that the condition of
the account may have been due to the dishonesty of employees
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entrusted with sums of money to be deposited therein. He
offered no evidence of the suggested dishonesty. By his own
admission he continued to make overdrafts against the account after he was informed by the bank that the aceount
was overdrawn. Upon notice of an overdraft he would deposit personal funds in the trust account but during the three
year period he never succeeded in correcting the deficiency
in tlle account. The last overdrawal occurred in August, 1951,
less than a month prior to his statement in court that the
account had never been overdrawn.
'rhe petitioner testified that he did not employ a bookkeeping system which would show a balance of funds he held
in trust. He never knew, then, the level at which the trust
account should have been maintained. Following his court
appearance on September 17, he refunded the $750 to Pilar
Vargas and Joe Diaz. Thereafter, he states, he succeeded in
balancing his trust account but is still unable to discover the
reason for the deficiencies. He reported that it required
"some $2,000" of his personal funds to balance the account.
He admits that the condition of the account indicated that he
had commingled other trust funds with the $750 here in
question.
The record shows that the petitioner was guilty of an unjustified omission to safeguard his clients' funds. [2] It has
been held that ''Gross negligence is a breach of the fiduciary
relationship that binds an attorney to the most conscientious
fidelity to the interests of his client. [Citations.] It warrants
disciplinary action, since it is a violation of his oath to discharge his duties to the best of his knowledge and ability."
(Clark v. State Bar, 39 Cal.2d 161, 164 [246 P.2d 1]; see, also,
Watennan v. State Bar·, 8 Cal.2d 17, 20 [63 P.2d 1133] .)
[3] In the present case the record justifies the conclusion
that the petitioner's conduct in overdrawing his account constituted more than negligence and carelessness on his part.
While it is true that the petitioner was called upon to
answer the court's inquiries on short notice and without an
opportunity to study his records, he answered unequivocally
an(t without qualification that there had been in excess of $750
in his trust account at all times since the deposit therein.
He stated before the Board of Governors that at the time he
made his answer in court he couldn't remember in what year
the $750 bad been dey>osited in his trust account, or when
the trust account had been overdrawn in connection with
the deposit. The deposit had been made more than three
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years previously; the last overdraft had occurred within the
previous month and the petitioner admits that he had been
informed on each occasion when he overdrew the account.
The reasonable inference to be drawn from the admitted facts
is that the petitioner knew, or was chargeable with knowledge,
that the balance of his trust account had not been in excess
of $750 at all time~> that the amount supposedly remained
therein.
[ 4] 'I' he untrue statement to the court by the petitioner
was made in a proceeding for an accounting in the matter of
the estate of Refugio Vargas. This proceeding had nothing
to do with the condition of the petitioner's trust account.
\\'hether the statement was material or immaterial to the
inquiry before the court it nevertheless is denounced by section
6068 (d) of the State Bar Act and constituted professional
misconduct if made with the intention of deceiving the court.
l t is doubtful whether it had any influence on the action of
the court in the accounting proceeding then before it.
[5] From the foregoing it is concluded that the record
supports the flnding that the petitioner was guilty of professional misconduct and was properly subjected to disciplinary
action. But under all of the circumstances disbarment appears to be out of proportion to the seriousness of the offenses
eommitted. The ends of justice would fully be met by the
suspension recommended by the local administrative committee.
It is therefore ordered that the petitioner be ·suspended
from the practice of the law in this state for the period of two
years, this order to become effective 30 days from the filing of
this decision.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
While I agree that petitioner was guilty of moral turpitude
and should be disciplined for his conduct, I cannot agree
that he should be suspended from practice for a period of two
years. In my opinion, suspension from practice for a period
of six months would be adequate under the facts disclosed
by the record in this case.
Furthermore, I do not agree with the holding in the majority opinion that gross negligence of an attorney in handling
his client's business warrants disciplinary action. In the absence of intentional wrongdoing, I do not believe it can fairly
be said that an attorney has been guilty of conduct involving
moral turpitude.
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The record here clearly discloses that petitioner was guilty
of conduct involving moral turpitude, although he apparently
had no intention of defrauding his client, and no loss was
suffered as a result of his misconduct.
Por the foregoing reasons I would suspend the petitioner
Jr-om
for a period of six months.

[S. :F'. Nos. 18674, 18675.

In Bank.

Mar. 30, 1953.]

WILLIAM HANLEY, Respondent, v. DANIEL C. MURPHY,
Individually and as Sheriff, etc. et al., Appellants.
[S. F. No. 18676.

In Bank.

Mar 30, 1953.]

BERNARD REILI-1Y, Respondent, v. THE CITY AND
COUNTY OF SAN Ii'RANCISCO et al., Appellants.
[1] Municipal Corporations-Charters-Construction.-Sections of
a municipal charter relating to the same subject must be construed together, giving effect and meaning so far as possible
to all parts thereof, with the purpose of harmonizing them and
effectuating the legislative intention as therein expressed.
[2] !d.-Officers and Employees-RemovaL-While charter of city
and county of San Francisco vests in a department head broad
power in effecting reduction of forces under his jurisdiction
(§ 20) and the budget-making procedure accords therewith,
the department head, in removing employees from positions in
his department, must act in conformity with applicable civil
service regulations.
[3] Civil Service-Merit System.-The civil service system rests
on the principle of application of the merit system instead of
the spoils system in the matter of appointment and tenure of
ofiice.
[ 4] Municipal Corporations-Officers and Employees-RemovaLAlthough a department head of city and county of San Francisco, in the exercise of his administrative discretion under the
charter, may effect a reduction of employees in his department
pursuant to his judgment as to the needs of the work, "any
other provision of this charter to the contrary notwithstand[2] See Cal.Jur., Municipal Corporations,§ 259; Am.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 239 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Municipal Corporations, § 78; [2, 4, 5]
Municipal Corporations, §309; [3, 7] Civil Service, §1; [6]
Municipal Corporations,§ 313; [8] Civil Service,§ 4; [9] Municipal
Corporations, § 314.5.

